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DividendTaxes, Corporate Investment, and "0"
ABSTRACT
Taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded
as a "double tax" on corporate income. This view implies that while the
total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic
decisions, the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders
and the corporation is irrelevant. Recent research has suggested an alter-
native to this traditional view. One explanation of why firms in the U.S.
pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this
form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments
associated with corporate distributions. This capitalization leaves in-
vestors indifferent at the margin between corporations paying our dividends
and retaining earnings. This alternative view holds that while changes in
the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth, they will have no
impact on corporate investment decisions.
This paperdevelops econometric tests which distinguish between these
twoviews of dividend taxation. By extending Tobin's "q" theory of invest-
ment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal leves, the
implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived.
The competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment
equations estimates under each theory's predictions. British time series
data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend
taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates
on corporate distributions. The econometric results suggest that dividend
taxes have important effects on investment decisions.
James M. Poterba Lawrence H. Summers
Department of Economics National Bureau of Economic Research
Nuffield College 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Oxford OXl 1NF Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
England
(617) 868—3909The influence of taxation on corporate investment decisions has been the
subject of numerous economic investigations. For the most part, these studies
have focused only on the effect of taxes levied at the corporate level,
examining the impact of changes in the corporate tax rate and depreciation
rules. The effects of reform in the taxation of corporate distributions have
received far less attention. This omission is significant since in Britain
during the last three decades the effective tax rate on corporate distribu-
tions has ranged between zero and thirty percent.
Taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a
tldoubletax" on corporate income. This view implies thatwhile the total
effectivetaxrate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions,
the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corpora-
tion is irrelevant. Recent research has suggested an alternative to this
traditional view. One explanation of why firms in the U.S. pay dividends
in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribu-
tion is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with
corporate distributions. This capitalization leaves investors.indifferent
at the margin between corporations paying out dividends and retaining
earnings. This alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend
tax rate will affect shareholder wealth, they will have no impact on cor-
porate investment decisions.
This paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these
two views of dividend taxation. By extending Tobin's "q" theory of invest-
ment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels, the
implications of each view for corporate investment decisions are derived.
The competing views are tested by comparing the performance of investment—2—
equations estimated under each theory's predictions. British time series
data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend
taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates.
on corporate distributions. The ecOnometric results suggest that divid.nd
taxes have important effects on investment decisions.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first describes the com-
peting views of dividend taxes in more detail. The implications of each
view for stock market valuation and the investment decisions of the firm
are explored. The second section presents a version of the "q"investment
theory based on the decisions of value—maximizing firms with stochastic
adjustment costs. Alternative investment equationsbased on the two views
of dividend taxes are derived. The third section details the construction
of the time series data which underlie our tests. It contributes an im-
proved estimate of a tax—adjusted "q" variable for the entire postwar
periodin Britain. Econometric results, and their implications for the
roleof dividend taxation in affecting investment decisions, are discussed
in the fourth section. A concluding section summarizes the findings and
proposes several directions for future research.—3--
I. Dividend Taxes and Corporate Distributions: Two Views
Analysis of the tax incentives for corporate distributions requires a
consistent framework for treating changes in both tax rates and tax systems.
We follow King (1977) in defining T as the rate of tax on undistributed
corporate profits, m as the marginal personal tax rate on dividend income,
and 8 as the shareholder's dividend receipts if the firm distributes one
pound of retained earnings.1 Therefore, if the firm distributes one pound
the shareholder receives (l—m)O pounds in after tax dividends. The effect-
ive rate of capita.l gains taxation is denoted by z.It depends on both the
tax rate applicable to realized capital gains and the length of time between
accrual and realization of gains.
A corporation affects its shareholders' tax liabilities by choosing
whether to retain or to distribute corporate profits. The traditional view
implies that investors should not be indifferent to the firm's financial
policy. Since a pound retained yields (1—z). to the investor and a pound
distributed yields (l—m)O, only in the exceptional case when (l—z) (l—m)O will
investors receive the same after tax return from retentions and distribu-
tions.2 For Britain, (l—z) > (l.-m)8 for the period 1947—58 and 1966—72.
Between 1959 and 1965, the two tax burdens were approximately equal. Since
1972, investors should have preferred dividends to capital gains since
under the current imputation system (1—z) < (l—m)O. Despite these tax
changes, British firms have continued simultaneously retaining earnings
1 King's (1977) definition of Scorresponds to our S. Under the classical
system of company taxation, 0 =1.Under the imputation system currently
used in Britain, 0 =(1—sYwhere s is the imputation rate.
2'hisassumes that a pound of retentions increases the firm's value by a
pound.This is consistent with the "traditional" view but counter to the
spirit of the "new" view discussed below.—4—
and paying some of their profits as dividends (see Bank of England (1981)).
The payout ratio has not moved in the dramatic way which the simple tax
rule calculations would suggest.
The firms' apparent failure to optimize their financial policies with
respect to tax liabilities raises a difficult problem for investment theory.
A profit—maximizing firm should invest until the marginal return from addi-
tional investment equals the cost of capital. When the effective cost of
funds from different sources is unequal, the cost of capital becomes an
elusive concept. A firm's investment policy will depend upon its marginal
source of investment funds. The firm cannot be simultaneously indifferent
between investing a pound and reducing dividends, and between investing
a pound and issuing new equity. This is because the two financial actions
have different tax costs associated with them.
Different assumptions about the firm's marginal source of investment
finance have different implications for the investment consequences of
dividend taxes. The first approach, corresponding to the "traditional
view", argues that for some poorly understood reason firms act as if they
are required to distribute a substantial fraction of their real profits
in dividends. Subject to this constraint, the firm chooses an optimal in-
vestment plan and, when necessary, finances investment expenditures by
issuing new equity. In an all—equity economy, the firm's cost of capital is
) +Y(')
(1.1) c = '1''< 0
[(1 -m)Oy+ (1 -z)(1-y)j(l-T)
where y is the dividend—payout ratio, and p is the post—tax rate of return—5—
demanded by investors.3 The (y) function captures the cost to the firm
of retaining earnings. It may be thought of as arising from considerations
of market signalling, or investor liquidity. Since lower payout ratios
induce investors to demand higher returns, 'isnegative. The firm chooses
its payout ratio to minimize the effective cost of capital. This means that
=0,where y* is the optimal payout ratio. The firm's optimal invest— I
mentpolicy should consist of equating the pretax return on capital and the
cost of capital. Since c depends on the tax rates, changes in either the
personal dividend tax rate (m) or the relative tax prices of dividends and
retentions (8) will affect investment policy.
This "traditional" model has several implications for the effects of
a change in the dividend tax rate. First, as dividend taxes increase the
dividend payout ratio should decline. The firm is equating the marginal
benefit from dividend payments, captured in the P function, with the marginal
cost of those payments. Since an increase in the dividend tax rate will
raise the marginal cost of these unmeasured benefits, the optimal payout
ratio should decline.5 A second implication of this model is that when the
dividend tax rate rises, equilibrium capital intensity will decline. Since
in equilibrium f'(k) =cwe can solve for the change in the capital stock
Extension of the cost of capital expression to include the case of partial
debt finance is straightforward. If b is the ratio of the market value of
outstanding debt to the replacement value of the capital stock, then c' =
b(l—T)1+(l—b)c,where c is taken from (1.1) andis the nominal interest
rate. Debt finance is treated in more detail in Section II.
We consider "dividend tax" to mean the total (personal and corporate) tax
liabilities associated with the distribution of one pound of retained
earnings. This is (l—m)O.
Feidstein (1970, 1972) and King (1971, 1972) tested the hypothesis that the
payout ratio responded to changes in the effective dividend tax rate and
concluded that taxes did seem to affect firms' choice of dividend policy.
Their studies, however, did not focus primarily on the personal taxes
imposed on dividends.—6—
from
(1 2) f"(k)= -- + -- • d3 2yd3
where=(1—m)O.If the firmhaschosen y optimally, then =0and
1 1*
the envelope theorem allows us to ignore the second term in (l.2) At the ini-
tial optimum, changes in the dividend payout ratio do not change the cost of
capitaL Therefore the effects of taxes on capital intensity which come
from changes in the payout ratio may be ignored. This means
(1.3) =____ = ________y(p+ —>0
{y +(1—y)(l—z)] (1—
Theeffective dividend tax rate is tD1 —. Thismeans <0.
D
The capital stock's response to changes in the dividend tax was calcu—
lated assuming that changes in the tax rate did not affect the pretax return
required by investors. An alternative extreme assumption is that capital
is supplied inelastically. The only effect of a dividend tax increase is a
reduction in the equilibrium rate of return, p. If capital was supplied
with some positive elasticity, then an increase in the dividend tax rate
would decrease both capital intensity and the rate of return.
Tlicre are two difficulties with this view of dividend taxes. First,
the theory provides no explanation for why firms pay dividends. Equivalently
stated there is no motivation for the 'Y(y) function. Edwards (1981) and
and Stiglitz (1980) have discussed some of the leading explanations,-- 7—
suchas market signalling (Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979)) and investor
clienteles (Feldstein and Green (1981)), and concluded that in almostevery
case, there would exist a mechanism with a lower tax cost for
transmitting
information or income from the firm to the shareholder.The payment of
dividends remains a puzzle in the "traditional"view. Second, the theory
implies that the marginal source of funds for new investmentis either
new equity issues or reduced share repurchases. Since thelatter are illegal
under Section 66 of the 1948 Companies Act, and most firms donot issue
new shares, the theory's premise seems unlikely.
The "new" view of dividend taxes, based on the notion of tax capitali-
zation, was developed as a response to the problem of explaining why firms
paydividends.6 The new viewmay be understood in terms of the above dis-
cussion as a different assumption about the firm's financial margin. The
dividend payout ratio is no longer fixed; dividends each period are deter-
mined as residual after desired new investment has been financed out of
retentions. If q represents the market's valuation of a pound of earnings
inside the firm, then the return to distributing earnings as dividends is
(l—m)9 and that from retentions is q(l—z). Firms will continue to invest
until investors are indifferent between paying out earnings and retaining
them. This means that q must equal
(1.4) q* = = 0.
Indeed in any model in which it is rational for firms to pay dividends,
this condition must hold. It implies that the marginal value to shareholders
of retentions equals that of dividends.
6
The tax capitalization hypothesis which underlies the new view was suggested
implicitly in the work of King (1977), and explicitly by Auerback (l979a,
1979b) and Bradford (1981).—8—
For the United States throughout the postwar era and Britain until 1973,
<1.The new view was developed to explain firm behavior when q* is less
than one. Values of q* >1,as have prevailed in Britain since 1973, raise
some theoretical difficulties. Since dividends are tax favored, new share
issues are the preferred form of finance. A change in the dividend tax there-
fore affects on investment in the way we outlined for the traditional q* =1
view.
The cost of equity capital in the "q*l" world is independent of
either the dividend payout ratio or the personal tax rate on dlv—
idends. Regardless of the firm's financial policy, the cost of capital is
c =p/(l—z).It is easy to verify that if the firm earns this return on its
investments, shareholders will receive their desired rate of return. Con-
sider first a firm which distributes all its earnings in the form of dividends.
If the firm earns p/(l—z), it effectively pays Op/(1—z) in net dividends, on
which the shareholders are liable to taxes of mOp/(l—z). Therefore the
after tax return is (l—m)Op/(l—z). But since the price of a share is q*,
the rate of return is (l_m)pOI(l_z)q*=p.So by earning p/(l—z) the all—
dividends firm manages to provide its investors with their required rate of
return. Now consider the case of a firm which retains all its earnings.
If it earns p/(l—z) and retains this amount, then the value of a share rises
by (p/(l_z))q*. Investors pay capital gains tax on the value of this
increase, so they receive pq* after tax. The rate of return on this invest-
ment is just pq*/q* =p,so once again the investors are earning their
required rate of return. The dividend payout ratio is irrelevant to the
firm's cost of capital, and consequently to its investment plan.
Several other aspects of the q*l view deserve comment. First,provided
q*<l, firms never issue new shares. Firms are assumed to have sufficient—9—
cash flow to pay for current investment and stillpay some dividends.
Second, a change in dividend taxes leads to a recapitalization of the value
of corporate capital: this will reduce the value of stock marketequity,
but will not affect the rate of return earnedon shares. If the
desired wealth to income ratio is fixed, then an increase in the dividend
tax will actually increase equilibrium capital intensity byreducing the
market value of each physical unit of capital. Finally, permanent changes
in the dividend tax rate will have no effect on dividendpolicy. This is
because the firm's capital stock and investment, hence cashflow, are un-
affected by the dividend tax. Since dividendpayments are the difference
between income and investment expenditure, they must also be unaffectedby
the dividend tax.7
There are two principal difficulties with the capitalization model of
corporate investment. First, when q*<l, it predicts that firms should always
prefer acquiring new capital by taking over another company to purchasing
an equivalent amount of new capital. This is because the purchase price of
a new capital good is unity, but capital goods held by corporations are
valued at only (l—m)O/(l—z). Without limitations on takeovers, or other
devices for passing money to corporate shareholders without incurring dividend
tax liability, no equilibrium with q <1is sustainable. The second problem
with the capitalization theory is that it predicts volatile dividend payments
which will fall sharply when new opportunities make investment particularly
Suimners (1981) has observed that permanent changes in dividend tax rates
will have no effect, but temporary changes may have realconsequences.
Timing of dividend payment is also considered by King (1974). Bradford (1981)
has generalized the dividend tax neutrality result and shown that in a
model with debt and equity finance, the debt—equity ratio is unaffected
by changes in the dividend tax rate.— 10—
desirable.There seems to be little evidence that firms actually cut
dividends, and most research seems to support the notion of a rather
stable dividend payout ratio which managers set as a "target".8
Before discussing the two theories' implications for investment be-
havior, an important caveat is in order. There need not be a single
marginal source of finance for the entire economy. Different firms may
find it optimal to be on different margins9 and even within a single firm,
different forms of finance may be used on different projects. Therefore,
in the aggregate investment expenditures are likely to be financed partly
from new issues and partly from dividend cuts. Our empirical work attempts
to estimate the marginal funding shares which can be attributed to each
source.
These two views of dividend taxation have different implications for the
structure of investment relations based on Tobin's "q" theory. In a tax—
less world with homogeneous capital goods, Tobin (1969), following Keynes
(1936), explained that firms invest as long as each pound spent in acquir-
ing new capital goods raises the market value of the firm by at least a
8Anderson(1980) has conducted time series tests on the Lintner (1956)
"target payout ratio" hypothesis for Britain, and concluded that it ex-
plains the observed behavior of firms since 1963. For a general discuss-
ion of the difficulty of cutting dividends, see Brealey and Myers (1980,
Chapter 16).
Some firms may expect to experience negative profits in future years. If
this is true, many of the tax calculations which we perform are irrel-
evant: without taxable profits, the different rates of tax on different
sources of finance (to the firm) do not matter. This is just one explan-
ation of why different firms might be observed to behave differently.— 11—
pound.A number of empirical investigators10 have assumed that a good
approximation to the market value of an additional unit of capital is the
average market value of the existing capital stock. This amounts to
assuming that "average q", the ratio of the market value of the capital
stock to its replacement cost, is a good proxy for "marginal q".
Within this framework, it is natural to assume that the rate of
investment is an increasing function of "q". Given adjustment costs and
lags in decision making within the firm, one should not expect that all
investment opportunities which will increase market value by more than
their cost will be undertaken immediately. In fact, in the presence of
adjustment costs, firms will always choose to spread investment projects
over time.1'
In the traditional view of dividend taxes, the marginal pound which
is used to finance new investment comes from new equity issues, so the
firm will invest only if the ratio V/pK, where V is stock market value and
pK is the replacement value of the firm's existing capital stock, is greater
than unity. This means that the investment function takes the. form
(l.5a) Ig(— —1) g' >0.
g(0) =0
Note that when the capital stock is in equilibrium, no investment isoccurring
ql.
10
Examples of U.S. investment studies based on the "q" model
include von Furstenberg (1977), Ciccolo (1975), Engle and Foley (1975),
and Summers (1981). Studies using British data include Jenkinson (1981)
and Oulton (1978, 1979).
This assumes, implicitly, that a convex adjustment cost function applies
to investment activities. For a discussion of the plausibility of this
assumption and some alternatives, see Rothschild (1971).— 12—
Inthe q*l model, however, the marginal financial resources are obtained by
reducing dividend payments and the firm will therefore invest up to the point
at which the market value of an additional unit of capital, (l—m)O/(l—z),




implying that the equilibrium value of q is Thedistinction between
(l.Sa) and (l.5b) provides the basis for our tests for the competing dividend
tax hypotheses.
The various implications of the two views of taxes on corporate distri-
butions discussed in this section are summarized below in Table 1.
Table 1
Alternative Views of Dividend Taxation
p +)(y)
(l—m)Oy+(1-z)(l—y) (1— )
This heuristic discussion of the Tobin's q investment function ignores
numerous important aspects of the economic environment which affect invest-












explicitmodel of the movement to equilibrium have all been omitted. The
next section, provides a more rigorous justification for the q theory formu-
lation and derives a model which can be estimated using time series data.— 14—
II.The Investment Function
In this section we develop a theory of the investment behavior of a
value—maximizing firm in an environment with stochastic adjustment costs.
The model is based on Summers' (1981) extension of Tobin's "q" investment
theory to incorporate personal taxes. This formulation is one of several
ways in which a q investment equation can be motivated on the basis of
optimizing behavior of firms. Derivations based on lags in delivery or
recognition imply relations very similar to those estimated here. The
validity of tests comparing models of dividend behavior does not depend upon
literal acceptance of the assumptions underlying the derivation presented
below. The model developed here does constitute a denial of Sargent's
(1976) claim that correlations between investment and q have no structural
significance. We begin by considering the investment decisions of a firm
whichbehaves according to the capitalization hypothesis and constrast the
results with those obtained under the double tax view of dividend taxation.
Under the assumptions of the capitalization hypothesis, firms choose
to issue no new equity and are barred from repurchasing existing shares so
that prices are proportional to the outstanding value of a firm's equity.
We assume that equity holders require a fixed real after tax return p to
induce them to hold the outstanding equity. The sum of the expected net of




where Dg(t) defines gross dividend payments by the firm and V(t) is the market
value of the firm's equity. Future dividends are uncertain because of tech—
12Thevalue of pis the risk adjusted discount rate which investors apply
totheir expected equity returns. Ifexpectationsare exactly satisfied
this is the return they will receive. Note that in a risk free environ-
ment pwouldcorrespond to the after—tax return on alternative assets.nological shocks to the production
price and tax uncertainty could be
is taken over the random variables
solve the differential equation (2
must be imposed on the path of V.
value of the firm becomes infinite
him Et {V(s) e_1)_t)} 0
equation (2.1) and find that:
(2.2)
and adjustment cost functions. Factor
treated easily. The expectation in (2.1)
which generate these uncertainties. To
.1) for V(t), a transversality condition
Excluding the possibility that the
in finite time by requiring
enables us to solve the differential
— 15—
V(t) =E = Dg(S)exp(-S P(r)dr})dS
Note that the expectation in (2.2) is over the entire future path of random
variables which affect dividends.
The firm seeks to maximize (2.2) subject to constraints on its initial capital
stock and its investment program. We will assume that credit market constraints
do not permit the firm to finance more than a fraction b of its investment through
debt finance. This can be thought of as a measure of the firm's debt capacity.
In the model presented below, the firm will always choose to borrow as much as
possible, so b percent of all new investment finance comes from debt issues and
(1—b) from retained earnings.
Any theory of investment, as opposed to a theory of the optimal capital stock,
must explain why the firm does not instantaneously adjust its capital stock. We— 16—
assumethat there are internal adjustmentcosts)3 The cost in terms of
managerial time and resources of installing new capital is assumed to rise
with the rate of capital accumulation.We assume that the adjustment cost
function, (,E1) is convex, homogeneous in investment and capital, subject
to random shocks and that (Ol) E 0. Under these conditions dividends
may be derived as after tax profits less investment expenses.
(2.3) Dg =(1—T){pF(K,L,E7)
-wL-pibK}—{l—u-b+(1-t)(,e1)}pI + tD
Where K and L refer to factor inputs, p is the overall price level, F(K,L,c2)
is the production function which is subject to random shocks c2, w the wage rate,
i the nominal interest rate, -r the effective corporate tax rate on undistributed
profits, u, rate of first year write—off s on investment, and D, the value of writing
down allowances on past investment. Adjustment costs are assumed to be expensed
and hence ineligible for investment incentivetreatment.14 We have assumed that
firms have positive profits at all times and are able to deduct depreciation
allowances from corporate taxes. This may be an unreasonable assumption for tha
last decade, and we discuss modifications in Section IV.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) imply that
13The operative distinction here is between internal adjustment costs, which
are resource costs to the firm induced by the decision to invest, and external
adjustment costs which correspond to an increase in the price of investment
goods as all firms attempt to invest more quickly. See Mussa (1977) for some
discussion of these issues.
l4 alternative assumption corresponding to external adjustment costs would
increase the price of investment goods to p+ (-Y}andthen allow the adjustment
costs to be eligible for investment grants and depreciation allowances. This
approach, used by Hayashi (1981), generates a slightly different formulation
of the equilibrium q relationship and the investment function. When we used
this approach and tested the competing theories of dividend taxes, the results







where B(t) is the present value of all remaining depreciation allowances which
can be collected on the capital stock in place at time t and u is the
present value taken to time s of depreciation allowances and investment in-
centives or Ll of investment at time s. This is discussed in greater detail
in Section III. Notice that in (2.4) the firm's value depends on expectations
of e1(s), c2(s)}, the realization of a bivariate continuous time
stochastic process.
The firm seeks to maximize (2.4), its current market value,subject to
the capital accumulation constraint
(2.5) K(t) =1(t)—5K(t)
I is gross investment and S is thetruedepreciation rate on capital. The firm
ignores B(t) in its maximization, since it is independentof any future decisions.
The maximization problem can be solved using Pontryagin's maximum principle.
Thefirstorder condition for investment at time tis:
(2.6) {l -u-b+({, c})l -t})p=-- (1-t)()1(,c1)p
Equation (2.6) implicitly determines the firm's investment behavior, since it
defines a function linking investment to the real shadow price of capital,





(1 -U - b)— 18—
Thisresult has an easy intuitive interpretation. The shadow price of an
dditional unit of capital is equated to its marginal cost, in after tax
pounds. One implication of (2.7) is that there will be investment even if
the shadow price of capital goods is less than unity, because the tax system
reduces the effective price of new capital goods.
Equation (2.7) is of no operational significance as a theory of invest-
ment unless an observable counterpart to the shadow price A can be developed.
Hayashi (1981) has shown in a less complicated model how the shadow price and
the market valuation of existing capital are related. Our result extends
his by considering the case of uncertain future dividend streams, and the
role of taxes levied at the personal level.
The link between A and market value can be demonstrated as follows.
Note that V(t) —B(t)given in (2.4) is homogeneous in K(t); a doubling
of K(t), together with the optimal doubling of investment and labor in
every subsequent period, will double V(t)—B(t). This follows from the
assumption of constant returns to scale in the production function and
homogeneity of the adjustment cost function. It follows that (V'(t)—B(t))
=ppK(t)where V*(t) is the value of the stock market at time t when the
optimal investment plan is followed. The maximized value of the firm at
time t, minus the value of depreciation allowances on existing capital,
is proportional to the value of the initial capital stock. The maximum
principle implies that dV*(t)IdK(t) =1(t);this is just what is meant by
the assertion that 1(t) is the shadcw piCC of new investment, or "marginal
q." Thisresult,along with the homogeneity condition, implies th2t
(2.8) 1(t) =V(t)—B(t)
pK(t)— 19—
Thisexpression provides an observable counterpart for the shadow price
of new investment, under the assumption that the firm maximizes value so
that V(t) =V*(t).Substituting (2.8) into (2.6) yields an implicit relation
for investment at time t.
(2.9) + Q
where the tax adjusted value of Tobin's q, Q, is defined by
(2.10)
={(1
m)O(V -B)-1+ u + b} l—z pK —
(1—T)
For simplicity, we assume that adjustment costs rise linearly with invest-
ment above some varying threshold.
(2.11) (
-— e1)2K i >fl+
0
implying that thefunction, which describes adjustment costs per unit of
investment, over the relevant range where>n +
(2.12) () =- (
—n — ci)2(F
This(functionis homogeneous in I and K as required. We assume that firms
always operate in the positive adjustment cost range. These assumptions
were chosen to yield the simple relation between investment and Q.
(2.13) =n+Q +— 20—
Thisis the linear investment relationship which we estimate in section IV.
Econometricissues, such as the independence of and Q, are discussed at
that point.
Before discussing the investment function under the alternative "q=l"
or "double—tax" hypotheses, several features of the investment function in
(2.13) deserve comment. First, the specification incorporates future ex-
pectations. Robert Lucas (1976) has argued that econometric investment
'equations which do not incorporate rational adaptation to policy changes
cannot be used to predict the effects of such changes. The approach deve-
loped here is not subject to this objection because the parameters which
are estimated, 6 and fl, are technological. Since policy actions are
assumed to have no effect on the adjustment cost function the investment
equation will be unaffected by changes in policy expectations. The q
model impounds expectations of future tax policy changes in the V/pK term.
While the market's valuation of existing capital will be affected by the
investor's expectations about the future, only the current values of the
tax parameters and the current value of the stock market enter the esti-
mated investment function. Second, other approaches to estimating the
investment impact of personal taxes require us to specify the firm's cost
of capital; the "q" formulation does not. Since the investors' discount
rate o enters the cost of capital and is unobservable, efforts to define
the cost of capital are prone to error. The "q" approach avoids this
difficull ty.
The superiority of the "q" approach can be illustrated by comparing
our strategy for estimating the effects of investment incentives with
those based on the flexible accelerator approach pioneered by Hall and— 21—
Jorgenson(1967). Presumably, one important channel by which tax incentives
influence investment is by reducing capital costs leading firms to raise their
desired supply of output. In the q model, expectations of higher output and
profits are immediately incorporated in the marketTs valuation of corporate
capital. By comparison, this expected output effect is constrained to be
zero in the neoclassical investment formulation where investment is modelled
holding desired output constant. Moreover, expected future output is modelled
as a distributed lag forecast based on past output, so changes in the firm's
expectations about future output are not allowed to depend on tax policy.
The model which was developed above assumed that the firm was choosing
between paying dividends and investing. This is the margin which underlies
the capitalization hypothesis. Now, we consider the model of the firm
which supports the double tax view of dividend taxation and investment.
The firm is assumed to pay out a fixed fraction, y, of its real profits




The firm chooses an optimal investment plan, hence an optimal capital stock
through time, and finances investment with new share issues whenever neces-
sary. If S is the value of new shares issued, then the equality of sources
and uses of financial capital implies
(2.15) Dg + 1 -
u1—h + (1 —T)(,s1)}pI =(1—T){pF(K,L,£2) —wL —pib
+ S + TD— 22—
Whenfirms issue new shares S(t), investors are indifferent to marginal
changes in their equity portfolio if
(2.16) pV(t) =E[(1 -m)OD(t) + (1 -c)((t)-S(t))]
Notice that the capital gain component which current shareholders value
is not the total increase in the market value of the firm, but only that
part which is not attributable to new share issues.
By solving (2.16) for tI)evalue of the firm, we find that the
"traditional" firm will maximize
-l




subject to K =I—5Kand (2.15).
Expression (2.17) just shows that as the firm issues more future equity,
the current shareholders' claim on the firm's total dividends is diluted.
The tr.iditional firm's first order condition for investment is
(2.18) -= (1-u-b+ (1 -T)EE( + l K
This 12 identical to (2.6) except for the rnO term which premulti1ied
in the old expression. This implies that the argument of the investment
function is now
(2.19) =(V_B) —1+ u + b
(1 -T)





Ourtests of the two hypotheses about the financial margin at which firms
operate are based on comparisons between investment equations (2.13) and
(2.20).
Because all firms may not be on the same margin, the aggregate
investmentfunction might be a weighted average of the "capitalization"
and the "double tax" investment functions. In order to allow for this
possibility,
we specified an investment equation with a weight of c on (2.20) and
(1—ct) on (2.13). If Z =(.1—rn)O/(l—z), then this weighted average invest-
ment equation takes the form
I {,+(l_a)Z}V_B +b+u—l
(2.21)—= + 13 pK i K (i-T)
Thetraditional view of the dividend tax is supported by estimates of a
near unity. If, however, is close to zero, then tax capitalization
would appear to be the more appropriate model. We estimate (2.21) and
perform this test in the fourth section of the paper.— 24—
III.Data
The principal data requirement for the estimation of the model developed
in the preceding section is the construction of time series for tax adjusted
Q, and the gross investment rate. This section describes the construction
of an annual time series for these variables —BritishIndustrial and Commercial
companies covering the period 1950 —1980.
A. Tax Adjusted Q
The vafues of the replacement cost of the capital stock, pk, the market
value of equity v1 and the debt capital ratio b, are drawn from the Bank of
ngland (1980) for the post—1963 period. Earlier data, on an annual basis,
were sometimes available from CSO. In other cases we extrapolated backwards
as described in an appendix. Information on the marginal rates of individual
income tax or dividends and capital gains (m and z) and the tax disincentive
to dividend payment ®, was obtained from King (1977) and King, Neldrett and
Poterba (1981).
The principal complexities came in the calculations of terms reflecting
the effects of depreciation allowances and investment inventives on old capital,
B, and new capital u. Estimates of u, using procedures similar to ours have
been presented by Meliss and Richardson for the post—1963 period. The only
previous attempt to calculate B was made by Oultori (1979) who assumed the
economy was in steady state through the period. Consistentestimates of B
and u can be derived for the entire post—war period from information on
tax depreciation rules.— 25—
Britishtax law identifies three distinct types of investment: 1) buildings,
2) plant, machinery and most types of vehicles, and 3) automobiles. The last
two are treated in essentially identical fashion except for minor differences
in the rates of writing down allowances. For each type of investment, wecalcu—
lated the present value of depreciation allowances which the firm could expect
to accrue over the lifetime of the investment. For each year after the invest-
ment and until the capital goods were completely written down for tax purposes,
15
we determined the present value of the remaining future depreciation allowances.
By aggregating the value of the remaining allowances over vintages of capital, we
computed the total value of the remaining depreciation allowances on the existing
capital stock.
The treatment of investment incentives on buildings will be described first.
Building investment, denoted Ib(t), is eligible for a tax free investment grant
(z) and taxable initial (z) allowances and investment allowances (z)in the
year of construction. In subsequent years, buildings are depreciated on a
straight line, historic cost schedule at the rate of writing down allowances
(z). The present value of the investment incentives on a one pound investment
is
g a i d s=T d
Z+T(Z+z + z ) b TZ




z+T(zb ++ z) Tzb Tb
= + [(l+r) —1]
(1 + r) r (1 +
where Tb(l_z_z)/z. This expression follows Oulton (1979) in assumingthat
firms pay taxes about one year in arrears. The discount rateused is r=(1—r)i
'5We have ignored the rather complex issues associated with the resale of
capital goods and the recapture provisions of the depreciation laws.— 26—
wherei is the nominal interest rate on British governmentconsolS. We chose this
rate becuase we are discounting a nominal stream ofafter—tax payments which is
essentially risk—free.
The expression for Ub describes the present valueof the subsidies which a
firm can expect to receive when it considers investingin a new building. A
related concept is the present value, at time t, ofthe remaining depreciation
allowances (the "value of the depreciation bond") on investment put in place at
time s<t. This consists of the present value of the writing down allowances for
the Tb(s)_(t_s) years remaining in the taxable life of the building. The value
of these remaining allowances, RlD(s,t), is just
T d b z (s)•T(t)
(3.2) Rb(s,t) Ib(s)* k+l k0 (1 + r)
Ib(s)zb(s)T(t) Tb(s,t)+l =
T(s,t) + 1{(l + r) —111
r(l+ r) b
where Tb(s,t) =Tb(s)
—(t—s).Both Ub and are computed under the assumptions
that 1) the firm will always have positive profits, againstwhich to deduct the
investment allowances and 2) firms anticipatethat the current corporate tax rate
will never change.
The tax treatment of plant, machinery, carsand other vehicle differs from
that for buildings in that the writing downallowances are granted on a declining
balance basis. The value of the plant which maybe depreciated is the initial
cost of the plant minus the investment grantand the initial allowance. In the
above notation with subscript "p" for plantand machinery,—27-
k-i
+ 1(+ + T(l —z)(l—a-zd) (1 -Zd)
(3•3)u =P p pp + p p p P
p
(1 + r) (1 + r) k=l (1 + r)k
and
l_Zd(S) k
(3.4) R (s,t) =I(s)*T(t)tC (s,t)
p p pkIl+t)
where C(st) [(lZ(S))(l_a(5) _zd(s))(l_Zd(s))]
The expressions for cars, u and R(s,t), are exactly the same with z replacing
z. Following the Bank of England (1980), we truncated the infinite series in (3.3)
and (3.4) at a 33 year lifetime for plant and a 10 year lifetime for autos. Since
1972 the tax law has permitted the full expensing of investment in plant and
machinery. This corresponds to zd=l.0, and all of the investment incentives are
collected in the year when the plant is installed.
The computed values of u, Ub, and U enabled us to compute the effective
investment incentive which applied in each year since 1948. We did this by weight-
ing the three investment credit series by the share of each type of gross invest-
ment)6 The resulting series, u, measures the reduction in the cost of new
investment goods which firms received because of investment incentives on a typical
pound of investment. The series peaked in 1977, when investment incentives
allowed firms to recoup 52.8 percent of investment costs. The full time series is
reported in Column I of Table One.
16
While the tax treatment of auto differs from that for other types of vehicles,
the available data on investment is typically divided into buildings, plant! machin-
ery, and all vehicles. To obtain the present value of investment credits on
vehicles, we again followed the Bank of England (1980) and formed a weighted
average of u and u with weighys .24 and .76, respectively. These weights
approximately correpond to the share of autos in vehicle investment. Some sensi-
tivity tests showed that our results are very insensitive to this weighting._28...
Ourcomputations onR(s,t) for the three types of investment expenditures allow
us to determine the remaining value of the depreciation bond for all capital
installed after 1947. However, for the early post—war years, it is important to
know about investment before 1947. Unfortunately, information on the vintage
composition of the capital stock which was standing at the end of World War II is
17
tenuous at best. We approximated the depreciation bond by assuming that the net
capital stock in 1948, K948, would depreciate at a constant exponential rateand
that companies would be permitted to deduct true economic depreciation on that
capital stock forever. The exponential decay rate was calculated to be.04 per
year using capital consumption and net capital stockdata. Therefore, we computed
s—1948 N
s-l948N d(l_d)k Td(l-d) l948
(3.5) Rr(S) =T(1-d) 1(1948k=l(1+r)k
-d+r
Todetermine the total value of the depreciation bond outstanding in any
year, we sum the value of the remaining allowances onall the vintages of each
type of capital good which are still eligible for credit.If T is the date
of installation of the oldest buildings which are still eligible for writing
do allowances, then Bb(t) Rb(s,t). Repeating this exercise forthe
sT*
other categories of investment
byields B(t) and B(t), which may then be
added to B (t)toproduce war
17Two of the best studies of capital formation before and immediately afterthe
war are Redfern (1955) and Dean (1964). Neither conveys muchinformation on the
vintage distribution of the capital stock remaining after the war.— 29—
(3.6) B(t) =B(t)+ Bb(t) + B(t) + B(t).
The actual values of this series are displayed in Column Two of Table One, and
there is quite a substantial amount of variation in the data. This suggests that
a computation based on steady states (i.e., Oulton (1979)) might be substantially
misleading. For 1980, a year when the total market valuation of equity and
preference shares was 81.94 billion pounds, the value of remaining depreciation
claims was 7.04 billion, or 8.6 percent of the market's valuation. Alternatively,
this may be thought of as 2.7 percent of the replacement value of the net capital
stock.
A practical problem in the constructicn of Q measures is the treatment of
inventories and work in progress. The definition of Q's denominator, the re-
placement value of the capital stock, is complicated by the presence of inven-
tories and work in progress. Two approaches to the treatment of inventories
were pursued. The first is to add together the replacement value of inventories
and the physical capital stock and consider this as a measure of the total
replacement value of the firm's physical assets. This approach, which we used,
requires computing Thealternative approach is to treat inventories
as liquid assets and to subtract their value from the numerator of Q and
compute
—B—INVThis method of adjustment was also tried, and it yielded
investment equation results very similar to those obtained with the first
V-B
procedure. We report the series for
pK+INV
in Table One, Column 3. This



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OurestimatesQandQareshown in Columns Four and Five of Table One.
Qiscomputed under the capitalization hypothesis and Qunderthe double
taxation view. The variance of Qunderthe capitalization hypothesis is 1.35
times thatofQ.
C.The Gross Investment Rate
The dependent variable in our specifications is the ratio of gross
investment to the net capital stock. Data on gross investment by ICCs is
available for the period since 1963. Before that, we extrapolated using
data from the Annual Abstract of Statistics on investment by quoted companies
and all non—nationalized companies. The net capital stock was computed in
a similar fashion, using data from the Bank of England (1980) for the period
since 1960 and Blue Book estimates of the net company sector capital stock
and net investment for the pre—1960 period. Our series for the investment
rate is shown in Column Six of Table One. The gross investment rate averages
7.5 for our sample period and peaks at 9.87 percent in 1964.
IV.Results
This section describes our empirical tests of the double tax and capit-
alization models. The two theories of dividend taxation give rise to the
alternative empirical models of corporate investment behavior presented in
(2.13) and (2.20). These equations are reproduced below; (4.la) corresponds
to the capitalization view and (4.lb) is derived under the assumptions of
the traditional model.
(4.la) = + + £1
(4.lb) =O+ +— 32—
Thedifference between Q and 5isthat Q adjusts the market value of the firm's
equity to take account of future tax liabilities on the firm's dividends,
while Q ignores this adjustment.
Before turning to the empirical results, it is necessary to discuss
several issues connected with the estimation. The exogeneity of Q in (4.la)
is a delicate issue. There is no reason to believe that Q and are
uncorrelated. Shocks to the adjustment cost function may affect market valu-
ation V, and therefore Q. This endogeneity is not likely to be severe since
the vast majority of the variance in Q arises from other sources. The left





Thisimplies that the bias is bounded by the variance ofc ,whicha. indicated
(5Q
below is negligible relative to the estimates of .Asa further precaution and
in order to treat errors in measurement V and K, many of the equations were
estimated using instrumental variables. The instruments were lagged values of
the tax rates which went into the construction of Q. There is no reason to
expect these variables to be correlated with technological shocks to the adjust-
ment cost function.
A
Preliminaryexperimentation revealed thatlaggedvalues of Q and Q entered
(.) with a very significant coefficient. While the theory developed in the
preceding section implies that lagged Q should have no impact on investment
given contemporaneous Q, lagged Q is included in all the estimated equations.
Its presence is justified by delivery and decision lags and by the possibility
of difficulties in data alignment. Inclusion of additional lagged values of Q— 33—
orlagged values of the dependent variable did not improve the predictive power
of the equations after making autocorrelation corrections.
The residuals in (4.1) displayed substantial autocorrelation. The
equations were therefore re—estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure
to correct the second order serial correlation in the residuals. Examination
of the correllogram of the estimated residuals suggested that this was suf—
ficient to achieve efficiency. The instrumental variable estimates were
corrected foT autocorrelation by applying the non—linear two stage least
squares procedure of Amemiya (1974) to the quasi—differenced form of (4).
We present results for three sample periods in Table 2: (1) 1950—80,
which is the full period for which our data were available; (2) 1963—80, the
period for which Bank of England data were available and during which it
was not necessary to make extrapolations and interpolations; and (3)
1950—72. There are two reasons for terminating the sample in 1972; both
relate to the tax reform which took effect in 1973. First, 1972 is the
last year when q*<l and the pure capitalization hypothesis should apply.
Since 1973, q*>l and we have assumed that firms treat this as q*l. The
second reason for excluding the last eight years is that since 1973,many
firms have paid no corporate profits taxes. Therefore, it becomes necessary
to re—examine some of the calculations in Section II: in particular, firms
will face values of t=0 which implies u=0 and B=0.If the firm pays no
taxes, depreciation allowances which can be written off against taxes are
of little value.'8
18We haveestimated equations for the whole sample in which we constrain
Tu=B=0 for the whole post—1972 period. This turns out to reduce the explan-
atory power of the equations and does not alter any of the basic results































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Theresults demonstrate the superiority of the Q specification based
on the "traditional view" of dividend taxation. It outperforms the equations
based on the capitalization hypothesis for all sample periods. The standard
error of estimate in the OLS equation is only 75 percent of that for the
alternative hypothesis. The "traditional view" specifications also provide
much better fits in the generalized least squares regressions, and the instru-
mental variable estimations.
A more formal comparison of the two hypotheses is possible. We begin
by reporting the likelihood ratios for the pairs of equations in Table 2.
These ratios represent the posterior odds ratio implied by Bayes' theorem
starting with a diffuse prior or the two hypotheses. That is, if one started
out assigning equal prior likelihoods to the estimated equations for two
hypotheses, and then used these equations together with standard rules of
inference, they represent the posterior odds ratio we would assign to the two
hypotheses.'9 In all cases, the likelihood of the "double tax" hypothesis
far exceeds that of the capitalization hypothesis. The worst case for the
traditional view suggests that it is almost six times more likely than the
new view.
Regression Pair Posterior Odds Ratio
50—80 sample, OLS 64.60 to 1
50—80 sample, AR2 367.49 to 1
63—80 sample, AR2 5.63 to 1
50—72 sample, AR2 80.57 to 1






For the special case when is assumed normally distributed and the- 36-
Analternative and perhaps more informative way of comparing the two
hypotheses is through a specification test. Pesaran (1974) has shown that
the Cox specification test takes a particularly simple form in the case of two
non—vested linear models. The test requires that one of the hypotheses be
chosen as the null. The Cox test statistic, p, is then asymptotically dis-
tributed as N90.l) under the null. It is essentially a measure of the
superiority of the relative performance of the null. The criterion for re-
jecting the null yields a one—sided test. If p is a large negative number,
the null is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
Cox Statistics
Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis Error Specification20 p
Capitalization (Q) Double Tax (Q) lID —16.07
Double Tax (Q) Capitalization (Q) lID 3.80
Capitalization (Q) Double Tax (Q) AR(2) —16.70
Double Tax (Q) Capitalization (Q) AR(2) 11.68
model is linear, this statistic reduces to
2
T/2
2 where a (y—x) under H1 and a =(y—x)under 112.The notion of
using posterior odds ratios to compare alternative model specifications has
a long history in statistics and econometrics. Zeliner (1979) discusses
themerits of this approach.
20 The test in the AR2 case was performed by quasidifferencing the data using
the average of the p1 and p2 values implied by equations 2a and 2b and then
using OLS. This is only legitimate because of the near equality of the
values of p1 and p2 in the two equations.— 37—
Whilethe results show that the double tax view isnever rejected in favor of
capitalization, the capitalization model is rejected witha high degree of con—
fidence in favor of double tax.21
While our research focuses on the use of investment equations to test
hypotheses about the financial behavior, the equations reported in Table 2
may be analyzed as investment equations in their own right. They support
earlier findings by Jenkinson (1981) and Oulton (1979) that theq theory model
can be quite powerful in explaining the observed investment behavior of
British industry. Our results suggest that an increase of 10 percent in the
stock market would raise the investment rate C, about 15 percent. The
coefficients on Q in the reported investment equations are larger than those
in earlier studies despite the division of our Q measure by (1—i).This
is probably due to our use of annual as opposed to quarterly data series,
22
the extension of the sample period and the improved estimates of tax effects.
Our equations also fit somewhat better than earlier efforts.
The equations also provide information about the dynamics of investment
behavior. The year—lagged value of Q always enters significantly and with
a coefficient that is about two thirds of the value of the current Q. Our
results indicate that about 60% of the total investment response to Q occurs
within a year of the change in the valuation ratio.
Part of the explanation for our larger coefficient is that annual data
on Q is less contaminated by short—term fluctuations in market value than
quarterly Q, so our equations are more successful at capturing the underlying
21Wealso tested the competing hypotheses by including both Q and Q in the
equation. In this case, Q andQ1always entered with significant positive
coefficients and Q, Q1 had negative coefficients which were sometimes
significant. This simple test also suggests that Q is more appropriate
than Q.
22Both Jenkinson (1981)and Oulton (1979) employ quarterly data compiled by
theBank of England for the period 1963—80 in their studies of investment.— 38—
long—termrelationship between Q and investment. Most of the noise and
measurement should be concentrated at relatively high frequencies while
day to day changes in the market's value and in equity prices may be the
result of new information or speculation; the longer term movements in the
market probably reflect something about investors' underlying view of the
returns to capital investment. This argument also explains why the correction
for autocorrelation reduces the coefficients of Q. Quasi differencing the
data increases the weight placed high frequencies.
Engle and Foley (1975) have invoked this argument and then estimated an
investment function for the United States using the band spectral regression
23
technique. This approach involves decomposition of the observed data series
into frequency components and then filtering of data to eliminate high fre-
quency variations. In applying this approach to British investment data, we
alternately chose to eliminate those components of the variance in Q which
occurred at periodicities below three and five years. The results, reported
below, show that in fact the low frequency relationship between the investment
rate and the valuation ratio is stronger than the relationship which is observed
using the raw data on Q and investment. The effect of an increase in Q which
is caused by a permanent change in the corporate environment, for example a
new tax policy, is larger than one caused by a momentary increase in stock
market values. The superiority of the Q to Q equations also remains evident
at low frequencies.
All of the tests of the two dividend tax hypotheses which we have
reported so far involve comparison of two alternative hypotheses. In Section
II, however, we argued that there was no single margin for the whole economy
23Bandspectrum regression is described in greater detail in Eagle (1974).— 39—
Table3
Band Spectrum Regression Results
Window 0 l R2 SSR
1 year, TCH 6.70 1.54 .47 23.845
(.23) (.30)
1 year, DTH 6.80 2.01 .79 18.03
(.18) (.30)
3 years, TCH 6.64 1.64 .50 22.451
(.29) (.40)
3 years, DTH. 6.76 2.11 .62 16.89
(.22) (.39)
5 years, TCH 6.56 1.78 .53 20.09
(.39) (.54)
5 years, DTH 6.68 2.31 .67 14.15
(.29) (.52)
Note: Calculations were performed using the Troll Program.— 40—
andthat in practice the aggregate investment equation would reflect a
weighted average of the two finance sources. Defining Z(l—m)O/(l—z), we
claimed that the aggregate investment function could be written
(4.4) =+ [(a+(1-a)Z)+u+b-1]+
wherea represents the fraction of investment financed at the margin by new
equity issues, and (1—a) the share financed out of retentions. The double
taxation hypothesis implies a1.0 while the capitalization view predicts
a =0.
The results of estimating equation (4.4) using non—linear least squares
are reported in Table 4. They tell a consistent story. The estimates of a
range from .76 to 2.16. In all but one case the hypothesis that a =0can
be rejected at the 5 percent level. The hypothesis is that a =1cannot
be rejected except for the 1963—80 period when a =2.16.These results
suggest that the capitalization hypothesis does not describe the behavior
of the firms who undertake any empirically significant fraction of investment.
The results in this section universally support the traditional view of
dividend taxation. The tax factor in Q implied by the capitalization view
clearly detracts from the explanatory power of the investment equations.
These results contrast with Summers (1981) who found that tax adjustments
added to the explanatory power of Q investment equations for the U.S. The
difference may arise because the earlier study tested the contribution of
all the tax effects jointly rather than just the effect of the adjustment






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results in this paper provide strong support for the traditional
view that dividend taxes discourage corporate investment. The data decisively
refute the hypothesis that by raising the cost of paying out funds to share-
holders, dividend taxes encourage investment through retentions. Rather, it
appears that in making investment decisions, corporations act as if marginal
investment is financed through new share issues. This suggests that the capi-
talization hypothesis cannot account for dividend behavior in the UK.
These findings have important implications for both tax analysis and
policy. They imply that even though only a negligible fraction of investment
is financed through new share issues, dividend taxes nonetheless have potent
effects on the cost of capital and investment. This implies that formulations
which employ weighted average costs of capital and assign a large weight to
retentions will badly understate the disincentive to investment caused by the
tax system. More generally, these results strongly confirm the importance of
considering taxes levied at both the corporate and personal levels in assessing
the tax system's impact on capital formation. This suggests the importance
of including variables reflecting personal taxes in standard investment sped—
f icat ions.
This research could usefully be extended in several directions. If the
investment equations reported here were coupled with a model of stock market
valuating it would be possible to obtain estimates of the effect of tax reforms
on investment. A rational expectations approach to modelling market valuation
is developed in Summers (1981), which shows how it can be used to estimate the
effect of policy announcements and temporary policy changes as well as the
types of reform usually considered. It might also be valuable to examine— 43—
empiricallythe effects of various tax reforms on q. This would require
modelling investors anticipations about future tax rules. The sources and uses of
funds identity connects decisions regarding investment, leverage, and payout
policy. It would be valuable to examine the effects of changes in q, and in
tax policy on these variables in a model in which they were jointly determined.
Most importantly, the negative findings in this paper regarding the
"capitalization" hypothesis underscore the importance of developing a satis-
factory theory of dividend behavior. The "traditional" view supported here
offers no convincing explanation for the payment of dividends. Until such an
explanation is found, it will be difficult to model persuasively the effects
of changes in tax pclicy regarding corporate distributions.— 44—
TABLEA—i: Data Used in Constructing "Q"
THETiP THETAHAT CGTAX TAXFACT MVE@*SHRI'DM MVPREFNETCAP BVSM
19480.450 1.5810.0001.150 6,402.0783,208 7,7342,991
19490,450 1.5700,0001.158 5,332.9842,082 8,1313,052
19500.463 1.5500,0001.201 5,726.1182,193 8,6963,062















19660,412 1,0000.1711,410 17,088.8701711 271678,706
19670,412 1,0000.1741.40526,694.1001,59327,9428,986
19680,412 1.0000.1671.417 41,662.3201,26629,5959,469
19690.412 1.0000.1541.439 34,819.2501,07632,839 10,539
19700,400 1.0000.1511.415 28,203.790 73837,255 11701
19710.388 1,0000.1491.391 38,346.830 96542,631 12,607
19720,386 1+2570,1471.105 34,292.400 84048,992 13,593
19730.413 1,4600,1450.998 24,455.000 55659,536 159O0
19740.432 1,5150,1430.996 14,497.000 51775,560 21,297
19750.437 1.5380.1410.99243,606.080 45192,892 25,123
19760.428 1.5270.1390.98641,163.020 547 110110 28,259
19770,417 1.5040,1370,98465,814.650 767 127865 34,167
19780.392 1.4600.1360,97386,484.580 736 149,392 38,698
19790,364 1.4290,1350.952108,343.320 781 177,665 46,245
19800.360 1.4290,1340.947 81,125.800 815 208,321 53,665
DataDefinitions and Legend:
THETAP =m,the marginal personal tax rate on dividends
THETAHAT =e, theeffective amount of dividends received by share-
holders when the firm distributes one pound
CGTAX =z,the effective tax rate on capital gains
TAXFACT =(l—Z),theinverse of the equilibrium value of q*.
(l—m)0
MVEQ*SHP,DOM =marketvalue of ordinary shares which correspond to
domestic earnings
MVPREF =marketvalue of preference shares
NETCAP =pK,the net value of the capital stock at replacement cost
BVSM =bookvalue of stocks and work in progress— 45-
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